Money buys influence. It should not be surprising, therefore, that in countries where remittances are important; the political effects are not inconsequential. In countries such as the Democratic Republic (where remittances are 10 percent of GDP), presidential candidates campaign in the United States. From Mexico to India, the lucre of remittances has led politicians to switch positions with regard to their Diaspora-from benign neglect to active courtship. Regimes in socialist economies like Cuba and the Democratic People’s republic of Korea have used remittances to augment scarce hard-currency resources and thereby to strengthen themselves in the short term.
It is possible to view remittances as political weapon of the weak. Rather than simply react to state policies, international migration and remittances have forced states to accommodate new realities. In lieu of political voice, migration becomes an exit strategy, and remittances either fuel further exit or empower political voice by making resources available to new groups.
It is possible to view remittances as political weapon of the weak. Rather than simply react to state policies, international migration and remittances have forced states to accommodate new realities. In lieu of political voice, migration becomes an exit strategy, and remittances either fuel further exit or empower political voice by making resources available to new groups.
However, as, international remittances are a form of cross-border financial flows, so, they also have international political effects. In many countries the importance and concentration of remittances affect bilateral relationships and foreign policy. The emergence of remittance communities creates source-destination dyads that increase covariant shocks and can become a coercive instrument on the part of migrant-destination countries.